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Preface 
There is a sense in which this book is an experiment in historiography, although not 
of a kind which is likely to meet with approval. Five or six years ago, when I was at 
the University of Warwick, a group of us commenced to prepare work for a book 
on the social history of crime in the eighteenth century in England. I offered, 
rashly, to submit a contribution on the origins of the Black Act. I knew nothing 
about this, but the importance of the Act in eighteenth-century legal history made it 
seem essential (for all our work) that something be found out. I supposed that 
sufficient documentation would have survived to enable me to write a brief study, 
without too much difficulty. 
The supposition was wrong and the difficulties proved to be serious. The central 
legal documentation as to trials of Blacks has been lost. Only one contemporary 
pamphlet offered any account of them. The press offered only scanty reports -
and some of these soon turned out to be misleading. To prepare even a simple 
narrative of events proved very difficult. (I am not yet sure that I have succeeded.) 
To offer a considered analysis was even more difficult, because not only the events 
but their context had been lost to historical knowledge. Thus the press and scattered 
indications in state papers showed that some disturbances centred on Windsor 
Forest. It seemed to me that the incidents revealed a resentment by foresters at the 
operation of forest law. But the standard authorities all assured me that forest laws 
(the Swanimote courts and the like) all fell into disuse at the time of the 
Commonwealth and were never thereafter revived. I had therefore to begin at the 
beginning, and to reconstruct the government of the forest in 1723. Similarly, it 
became clear that the 'Waltham Blacks' nourished a peculiar ill will towards 
successive bishops of Winchester. But almost nothing was known about the reasons 
for this, and very little has been written about the administration and finances of 
the Church more generally in the early eighteenth century. Thus, once again, it was 
necessary to reconstruct the episcopal context before one could see the Blacks 
within it. 
What made this exercise more hazardous was that I had neither read nor 
researched very much on any aspect of social history before 1750. Most historians 
do not put themselves at risk in this kind of situation, and they are wise not to do 
so. One normally reads very widely into a 'period', before or alongside one's 
researches, accepting the received context offered by previous historians, even if at 
the conclusion to one's work one is able to offer modifications to this context, I 
decided to work in a different way. I was like a parachutist coming down in 
unknown territory: at first knowing only a few yards of land around me, and 
gradually extending my explorations in each direction. Perhaps three quarters of 
this book (for my essay soon became too large for the co-operative book) is based 
upon manuscript sources. One source led me to the next; but, also, one problem led 
me to another. Deer-hunters in Windsor Forest led me to forest government, to the 
courtiers with their parks, and thence to Walpole, to the King (and to Alexander 
Pope). Deer-hunters in Hampshire led me to Bishop Trelawny and his stewards, to 
the eccentric Warden of Bere, Richard Norton, and, again, to Walpole and his 
courtiers. Deer-hunters in the environs of London led me, by routes far more direct 
than I had any reason to expect, once again to Walpole. As I pursued each line of 
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investigation I left it to a fairly late stage before I attempted to familiarize myself 
with the available historical writing. In fact, there proved to be very little of this, 
except, of course, when I came to Walpole and the Court; and here my debt to 
other historians will be apparent. 
This might appear to be less 'an experiment in historiography' than a way of 
muddling through. But I hope that it has turned out to be a little more. Since I 
started with the experience of humble foresters and followed up, through sketchy 
contemporary evidence, the lines that connected them to power, there is a sense 
in which the sources themselves have forced me to see English society in 1723 
as they themselves saw it, from 'below'. I have avoided, until late in this book, 
any general description of that society which could have come to me from the 
constructions of other historians. I cannot of course pretend to have approached 
the theme without prejudices and preconceptions: certainly I did not expect to 
find a society which was uncorrupt or wholly just. But the method and the 
sources have placed my preconceptions under some controls. Hence when I 
come, in the last chapters of this book, to look a little sourly at Walpole, Baron 
Page or Lord Hardwicke, and at the legal system and Whig ideology more 
generally, I think it possible that I may see them much as they were to be seen at 
the time, by William Shorter, the Berkshire farmer, or John Huntridge. the 
Richmond innkeeper. 
I have little doubt that experts in early-eighteenth-century society will call me 
to order, very properly, for my inadequate self-education, at some points, and for 
my treasonable views of Whiggery. Not all Englishmen, in 1723, were small 
forest farmers or customary tenants, and no doubt this way of writing history 
gives an intense but partial view. Someone must have benefited from Walpole's 
administration; although having read most of the state papers and most of the 
surviving newspapers for the years 1722-4, I am at a loss to know who this was, 
beyond the circle of Walpole's own creatures. 
I write in this way to tease Professor Plumb and his followers, from whose 
work I have learned a good deal. At least this work of reconstruction has done 
one thing which always gives a historian some pleasure. It has not only recovered 
to view an episode which had become lost to historical knowledge. It has also 
recovered an episode which was not known to contemporaries at the time. Some 
part of it was known, of course: occasional bits of gossip survive in private 
papers which show that far more went the rounds than Walpole ever permitted to 
be published in the press. And a good deal of it was known to Walpole, 
Townshend and Paxton. But even they did not know what the Reverend Will 
Waterson was writing in his private memorandum book, nor how their 
successors would tum the Black Act to new occasions. So that one puts together 
at the end, as one always hopes to do, an account which at many points is 
inferior to contemporary knowledge, but which is, in certain other ways, 
superior. 
I have tried to write the book in much the same way as I undertook the 
research. First, the context of Windsor Forest, the episodes, the analysis. Second, 
much the same procedure for the Hampshire forests and the 'Waltham Blacks'. 
Finally, we move towards London, getting ever closer to the measures and 
ideology of the Whigs, to the men who made the Black Act and to the law which 
they made. 
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PREFACE 
This study was originally planned as part of the collection of studies which has 
been edited by myself, Douglas Hay and Peter Linebaugh, as Albion s Fatal Tree 
(Allen Lane, 1975). Although it grew too large for that book, I benefited 
throughout from the co-operative discussions, and the exchance of references 
and of which rise to that work. My coeditorse were especially 
helpful m passmg to me mformation and in reading my early drafts; help also 
came from all of the extended seminar which originated at the Centre for the 
Study of Social History at the University of Warwick. In particular I must thank 
Jeanette Neeson for references from the Nonhampton Mercury and elsewhere; 
Malcolm Thomas for bibliographical advice; and Pamela James for typing a final 
draft. An old fnend, E. E. Dodd, has undertaken various research commissions 
for me, in the Public Record Office and at the Surrey Record Office. Howard 
Erskine-Hill, Trevor Griffiths and John Beattie have been kind enough to read 
and comment on my manuscript, and Pat Rogers (with whom I cross swords in 
the text) has kept me informed as to his own work. 
. In the course of my research dozens of people have patiently answered my 
mqumes, and I must apologize for being unable to acknowledo-e them all . . . e 
mdmdually. Mrs Elfrida Manning, of the Farnham Museum Society, was 
especially helpful; and I must also thank the Reverend Frank Sergeant, formerly 
of Bishop's Waltham; Mrs Monica Martineau of the same town; Mr A. P. 
Whitaker, the Winchester City Archivist; Mr Charles Chenevix Trench; Mr 
George Clarke (for information about Viscount Cobham); Mr Gerald Howson; 
Mr G. Ferard and Mrs Pamela Fletcher Jones. John Walsh, Eric Jones and A. R. 
Michell all sent me useful references. Particular thanks are due to those who 
allowed me to consult and draw upon their archives: I must acknowledO"e the 
gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to consult the Royal 
(Stuart Papers) as well as the Constable's Warrant Books in her library at 
Windsor Castle; the Master and Fellows of St John's College, Cambridge and of 
Christ Church College, Oxford; the Rt Hon. the Earl St Aldwyn (for the papers 
of Charles Withers, and also for permission to reproduce the portrait of Withers 
which hangs in Williamstrip Park); the Marquess of Cholmondeley (for the 
Cholmondeley (Houghton) papers of Sir Robert Walpole, now in the Cambridcre 
University Library); the Marquess of Downshire, for permission to consult the 
Trumbull correspondence in the Berkshire Record Office; the Dean and Chapter 
of Winchester Cathedral; His Grace the Duke of Marlborough (for the papers of 
Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough and of the Earl of Sunderland, at Blenheim 
Palace); the Town Clerk of the Royal Borough of Windsor (Windsor borough 
records); and Mr Richard Allen, the Headmaster of Ranelagh School, Bracknell 
(for the Waterson memorandum books). I must also thank the Librarian of the 
Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California, and Miss Anne Caiger, 
the Assistant Archivist, for sending me copies of materials on Enfield Chase in 
the Stowe Collection, Brydges Papers. I am also greatly indebted to the 
Librarians, Archivists and staff at the foregoing and at the following institutions: 
the British Library; the Bodleian Library; Cambridge University Library; 
Reading Reference Library; the Public Record Office; the County Record 
Offices in Berkshire, Hampshire, Surrey, and also Middlesex, Norfolk and 
Norwich, West Sussex and Oxford; the Portsmouth City Record Office; the 
Guildford Muniment Room; the Lambeth Palace Library; the National Register 
of Archtves; the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts; and Nottingham 
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University Library (Portland Papers). The archivists and their assistants at the 
Berkshire and Hampshire offices have been especially helpful, both in 
correspondence and on my several visits, and Miss Hazel Aldred in Hampshire 
drew to my attention several documents which I would otherwise have missed. 
Transcripts of Crown-Copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by 
permission of the Controller of H. M. Stationery Office, and my thanks are due 
to the Public Record Office for permission to reproduce the map of Windsor 
Forest (Plate 2). The map on p. 6 was drawn by Leo Vernon. 
Worcester, April 1975 
xiv 
Introduction: The Black Act 
The British state, all eighteenth-century legislators agreed, existed to preserve 
the property and, incidentally, the lives and liberties, of the propertied. But there 
are more ways than one of defending property; and property was not, in 1700, 
trenched around on every side by capital statutes. It was still not a matter of 
course that the legislature should, in every session, attach the penalty of death to 
new descriptions of offence. 
Premonitions of this development can be noted in the late seventeenth 
century. But perhaps no event did more to habituate men's minds to this recipe 
of state than the passage into law of 9 George I c.22, which came to be known 
as 'The Waltham Black Act' or simply as 'The Black Act'. This was enacted in 
the four weeks of May 1723. It was drawn by the Attorney and 
Solicitors-General upon the order, nem. con., of the House of Commons. At no 
stage in its passage does there appear to have been debate or serious division; a 
House prepared to debate for hours a disputed election could find unanimity in 
creating at a blow some fifty new capital offences. 1 
The first category of offenders within the Act is of persons 'armed with 
swords, fire-arms, or other offensive weapons, and having his or their faces 
blacked', who shall appear in any forest, chase, park or enclosed ground 'wherein 
any deer have been or shall be usually kept', or in any warren, or on any high 
road, heath, common or down ... By a layman's reading, it would appear that 
such persons must also be engaged in one of the various offences listed below. 
But the Act had scarcely been passed before it was enlarged by successive 
judgements, so that arming and/or Blacking might constitute in themselves 
capital offences2 
The main group of offences was that of hunting, wounding or stealing red or 
fallow deer, and the poaching of hares, conies or fish. These were made capital 
if the persons offending were armed and disguised, and, in the case of deer, if 
the offences were committed in any of the King's forests, whether the offenders 
were armed and disguised or not. Further offences included breaking down the 
head or mound of any fish-pond; maliciously killing or maiming cattle; cutting 
down trees 'planted in any avenue, or growing in any garden, orchard or 
plantation'; setting fire to any house, barn, haystack, etc.; maliciously shooting at 
any person; sending anonymous letters demanding 'money, venison, or other 
valuable thing'; and forcibly rescuing anyone from custody who was accused of 
any of these offences. In addition, there was a provision by which if a person was 
accused of any of these offences on informations sworn by credible witnesses 
and returned to the Privy Council - and if such person was then proclaimed by 
the Privy Council and ordered to surrender himself (and if he failed to so 
surrender) - he could, if apprehended, be deemed guilty and be sentenced to 
death without further trial. 
There were certain other provisions intended to expedite the operation of 
Read for the first time, 30 April: second time. I May; committee of the whole House. 4 and 9 May: amendments 
engrossed. !3 May: read third time. 18 May: passed in Lords. 21 May: royal assen!. 27 May. The only evidence of any 
division is the rejection. on 13 May. of an amendment offering to ensure that no person prosecuted under the Act could 
be punished a second time for the same offence under a different statute. No such lenity was allowed. Commons 
Jouma/s. XX. passim; Lords JOimrals. XXll. p. 208. 
For the Act in full see Appendix I. pp. 213-20. 
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Hanoverian Whios of the 1720s and 1730s were a hard lot of men. And they 
remind us that st:bility, no less than revolution. may have its own kind of Terror. 
iv. The Rule of Law 
We might be wise to end here. But since readers of this study may be provoked 
to some general reflections upon the law and upon Bntish traditions, perhaps we 
may allow ourselves the same indulgence. . . . 
From a certain traditional middle ground of national htstonography 
interest of this theme (the Black Act and its evolution) may be evident. But this 
middle ground is now being eroded, from at least two On one hand 
the perspective within which British political and social h_1stonans have been 
accustomed to view their own history is, quite properly, commg under challenge. 
As the last imperial illusions of the twentieth century fade, so preoccupation 
with the history and culture of a small island off the coast of Europe becomes 
open to the charge of narcissism. The culture of whtch 
flowered here under favoured conditions, is an episode too exceptional to carry 
anv universal' significance. If we judge it in terms of its own self -sufficient 
values we are imprisoned within its own parochialism. . 
Alternative perspectives must diminish the complacency natiOnal 
historical preoccupation. If we see Britain within of the 
expansion of European capitalism, then the contest over mtenor _nghts and laws 
will be dwarfed when set beside the exterior record of slave-tradmg, of the East 
India Company, of commercial and military imperialism. Or, to take up a bright 
new conservative perspective, the story of a few lost nghts and o"! a few 
deer-stealers struno from the uallows is a paltry affair when set beside the 
accounts of mass r:pression of any day in the day-book of the twentieth 
century. Did a few foresters get a rough partisan _What is 
that beside the norms of the Third Reich? Did the villagers of Wmkfield lose 
access to the peat within Swinley Rails? What is that beside the liquidation of 
the kulaks? What is remarkable (we are reminded) is not that the laws were bent 
but the fact that there was, anywhere in the eighteenth century, a rule of law at 
all. To ask for greater justice than that is to display mere sentimentalism. _In any 
event. we should adjust our sense of proportion; against the handfuls earned off 
on the cart to Tyburn (and smaller handfuls than have been carried off in Tudor 
times) we must see whole legions carried off by plague or dearth. 
From these perspectives concern with the rights and wrongs at law of a few 
men in 1723 is concern with trivia. And the same conclusion may be reached 
through a different adjustment of perspective, which may coexist with some of 
the same aro-uments. This flourishes in the form of a sophtst1cated, but a . . 
(ultimately) highly schematic Marxism which, to our seems_ to spnng 
in the footsteps of those of us in an older Marxist tradition. From this standpomt 
the law is, perhaps more clearly than any other cultural or artefact, 
by definition a part of a 'superstructure' adapt_ing itsel!' to the of an 
infrastructure of productive forces and productive relatiOns. As such, It IS clearly 
an instrument of the de facto ruling class: it both defines and defends these 
rulers' claims upon resources and labour-power - it says what shall be property 
and what shall be crime - and it mediates class relatiOns with a set of 
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appropriate rules and sanctions, all of which, ultimately, confirm and consolidate 
existing class power. Hence the rule of law is only another mask for the rule of a 
class. The revolutionary can have no interest in law, unless as a phenomenon of 
ruling-class power and hypocrisy; it should be his aim simply to overthrow it. 
And so, once again, to express surprise at the Black Act or at partial judges is -
unless as confirmation and illustration of theories which might easily be 
demonstrated without all this labour- simply to expose one's own naivety. 
So the old middle ground of historiography is crumbling on both sides. I 
stand on a very narrow ledge, watching the tides come up. Or, to be more 
explicit; I sit here in my study, at the age of fifty, the desk and the floor piled 
htgh w1th five years of notes, Xeroxes, rejected drafts, the clock once a£ain . . D 
movmg mto the small hours, and see myself, in a lucid instant, as an 
anachronism. Why have I spent these years trying to find out what could, in its 
essential structures, have been known without any investigation at all? And does 
it matter a damn who gave Parson Power his instructions: which forms brouo-ht 
'Vulcan' Gates to the gallows; or how an obscure Richmond publican managed to 
evade a death sentence already determined upon by the Law Officers, the First 
Minister and the King? 
I am disposed to think that it does matter; I have a vested interest (in five 
years of labour) to think it may. But to show this must involve evacuatino-
received. assumptions - that narrowing ledg: of traditional middle ground 
and movmg out onto an even narrower theoretical ledge. This would accept, as it 
must, some part of the Marxist-structural critique; indeed, some parts of this 
study have confirmed the class-bound and mystifying functions of the law. But it 
would reject its ulterior reductionism and would modify its typology of superior 
and mfenor (but determining) structures. 
First, analysis of the eighteenth century (and perhaps of other centuries) calls 
in question the validity of separating off the law as a whole and placino- it in 
some typological superstructure. The law when considered as (the 
courts, with their class theatre and class procedures) or as personnel (the judges, 
the lawyers, the Justices of the Peace) may very easily be assimilated to those of 
the ruling class. But all that is entailed in 'the law' is not subsumed in these 
institutions. The law may also be seen as ideology, or as particular rules and 
sanctions which stand in a definite and active relationship (often a field of 
conflict) to social norms; and, finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its own 
logic, rules and procedures - that is, simply as law. And it is not possible to 
conceive of any complex society without law. 
We must labour this point, since some theorists today are unable to see the 
law except in terms of 'the fuzz' setting about inoffensive demonstrators or 
cannabis-smokers. I am no authority on the twentieth century, but in the 
eighteenth century matters were more complex than that. To be sure I have tried 
to show, in the evolution of the Black Act, an expression of the ascendancy of a 
Whig oligarchy, which created new laws and bent old legal forms in order to 
!egitimize its own property and status; this oligarchy employed the law, both 
mstrumentally and ideologically, very much as a modern structural Marxist 
should expect it to do. But this is not the same thing as to say that the rulers had 
need of law, in order to oppress the ruled, while those who were ruled had need 
of none. What was often at issue was not property, supported by law. against 
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no-property; it was alternative definitions of property-rights: for the landowner, 
enclosure - for the cottager, common rights; for the forest officialdom, 
'preserved grounds' for the deer; for the foresters, the right to take turfs. For as 
long as it remained possible, the ruled- if they could find a purse and a lawyer 
- would actually fight for their rights by means of law; occasionally the 
copyholders, resting upon the precedents of sixteenth-century law, could actual_ly 
win a case. When it ceased to be possible to continue the fight at law, men still 
felt a sense of legal wrong: the propertied had obtained their power by 
illegitimate means. 
Moreover, if we look closely into such an agrarian context, the distinction 
between law, on the one hand, conceived of as an· element of 'superstructure', 
and the actualities of productive forces and relations on the other hand, becomes 
more and more untenable. For law was often a definition of actual agrarian 
practice, as it had been pursued 'time out of mind'. How can we distinguish 
between the activity of farming or of quarrying and the rights to this strip of 
land or to that quarry? The farmer or forester in his daily occupation was moving 
within visible or invisible structures of law: this merestone which marked the 
division between strips; that ancient oak - visited by processional on each 
Rogation Day - which marked the limits of the parish grazing; those other 
invisible (but potent and sometimes legally enforceable) memories as to which 
parishes had the right to take turfs in this waste and which parishes had not; this 
written or unwritten custumal which decided how many stints on the common 
land and for whom - for copyholders and freeholders only, or for all 
inhabitants? 
Hence 'law' was deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive 
relations, which would have been inoperable without this law. And, in the second 
place, this law, as definition or as rules (imperfectly enforceable through 
institutional legal forms), was endorsed by norms, tenaciously transmitted 
through the community. There were alternative norms; that is a matter of course; 
this was a place, not of consensus, but of conflict. But we cannot, then, simply 
separate off all law as ideology, and assimilate this also to the state apparatus of 
a ruling class. On the contrary, the norms of foresters might reveal themselves as 
passionately supported values, impelling them upon a course of action which 
would lead them into bitter conflict- with 'the law'. 
So we are back, once again, with tluu law: the institutionalized procedures of 
the ruling class. This, no doubt, is worth no more of our theoretical attention; we 
can see it as an instrument of class power tout court. But we must take even this 
formulation, and see whether its crystalline clarity will survive immersion in 
scepticism. To be sure, we can stand no longer on that traditional ground of 
liberal academicism, which offers the eighteenth century as a society of 
consensus, ruled within the parameters of paternalism and deference, and 
aoverned by a 'rule of law' which attained (however imperfectly) towards 
impartiality. That is not the society which we have been examining; we have not 
observed a society of consensus; and we have seen the law being devised and 
employed, directly and instrumentally, in the imposition of class power. Nor can 
we accept a sociological refinement of the old view, which stresses. the 
imperfections and partiality of the law, and its subordination to the 
requirements of socio-economic interest groups. For what we have observed IS 
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mo:e than the law as a pliant medium to be twisted this way and that 
by whichever mterests already possess effective power. Eighteenth-century law 
was more substantial than that. Over and above its pliant, instruri1ental functions 
it existed in its own right, as ideology; as an ideology which not only served, in 
respects, but which also legitimized class power. The hegemony of the 
century gentry and aristocracy was expressed, above all, not in 
not. in the mystifications of a priesthood or of the press, not even 
m economic coercmn, but in the rituals of the study of the Justices of the Peace 
in the quarter-sessions, in the pomp of Assizes and in the theatre of Tyburn. ' 
. the I.aw (we agree) be seen instrumentally as mediating and 
extstent class relatiOns and, ideologically, as offering to these a 
But. w_e must press our definitions a little further. For if we say that 
class relatiOns were mediated by the law, this is not the same thing as 
saymg that the law was no more than those relations translated into other terms 
which masked or mystified the reality. This may, quite often, be true but it is noi 
the whole truth. For class relations were expressed, not in any way one likes, but 
through the forms of law; and the law, like other institutions which from time to 
time can be seen as mediating (and masking) existent class relations (such as the 
Church or the media of communication), has its own characteristics its own 
independent history and logic of evolution. ' 
Moreover, people are not as stupid as some structuralist philosophers 
suppose .them to be .. They will not be mystified by the first man who puts on a 
wtg. It IS m the especial character of law, as a body of rules and 
procedures, that It shall apply logical criteria with reference to standards of 
universality and It is that certain categories of person may be 
excluded from this logic (as children or slaves), that other categories may be 
from access to parts the logic (as women or, for many forms of 
eighteenth-century law, those Without certain kinds of property), and that the 
poor may often be excluded, through penury, from the law's costly procedures. 
All and more, IS true. _But tf too much of this is true, then the consequences 
plamly Most men have a strong sense of justice, at least 
With regard to their own interests. If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then 
It will mask nothmg, legitimize nothmg, contribute nothing to any class's 
hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law in its function 
as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross and 
shall se.em_ to be JUSt: It seem to be so without upholding its own logic 
and cntena . of eqmty; mdeed, on occasion, by actually being just. And 
furthermore IS not often the case that a ruling ideology can be dismissed as a 
even rulers find a need to legitimize their power, to moralize 
to feel themselves to be useful and just. In the case of an ancient 
htstoncal formation the law, a discipline which requires years of exacting 
study to master, there will always be some men who actively believe in their own 
procedures and in the logic of justice. The law may be rhetoric, but it need not 
be empty .rhetoric. Blackstone's Commentaries represent an intellectual exercise 
far more ngorous than could have come from an apologist's pen. 
I do not know what transcultural validity these reflections may have. But they a:e applicable to England in the eighteenth century. Douglas Hay, in a 
stgmfiCant essay in Albion S Fatal Tree, has argued that the law assumed unusual 
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pre-eminence in that century, as the central legitimizing ideology, displacing the 
religious authority and sanctions of previous centuries. It gave way, in its turn, to 
economic sanctions and to the ideology of the free market and of political 
liberalism in the nineteenth. Tum where you will, the rhetoric of 
eighteenth-century England is saturated with the notion of law. Royal absolutism 
was placed behind a high hedge of law; landed estates were tied together with 
entails and marriage settlements made up of elaborate tissues of law; authority 
and property punctuated their power by regular 'examples' made upon the public 
gallows. More than this, immense efforts were made (and Hay has explored the 
forms of these) to project the image of a ruling class which was itself subject to 
the rule of law, and whose legitimacy rested upon the equity and universality of 
those legal forms. And the rulers were, in serious senses, whether willingly or 
unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric; they played the games of power 
according to rules which suited them, but they could not break those rules or the 
whole would be thrown away. And, finally, so far from the ruled shrugging 
off this rhetoric as a hypocrisy, some part of it at least was taken over as part of 
the rhetoric of the plebeian crowd, of the 'free-born Englishman' with his 
inviolable privacy, his habeas corpus, his equality before the law. If this rhetoric 
was a mask, it was a mask which John Wilkes was to borrow, at the head of ten 
thousand masked supporters. 
So that in this island and in that century above ali one must resist any slide 
into structural reductionism. What this overlooks, among other things, is the 
immense capital of human struggle over the previous two centuries against royal 
absolutism. inherited, in the forms and traditions of the law, by the 
gentry. For in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the law 
had been less an instrument of class power than a central arena of conflict. In 
the course of conflict the law itself had been changed; inherited by the 
eighteenth-century gentry, this changed law was, literally, central to their whole 
purchase upon power and upon the means of life. Take law away, and the royal 
prerogative. or the presumption of the aristocracy, might flood back upon their 
properties and lives; take law away and the string which tied together their lands 
and marriages would fall apart. But it was inherent in the very nature of the 
medium which they had selected for their own self-defence that it could not be 
reserved for the exclusive use only of their own class. The law, in its forms and 
traditions, entailed principles of equity and universality which, perforce, had to 
be extended to all sorts and degrees of men. And since this was of necessity so, 
ideology could turn necessity to advantage. What had been devised by men of 
property as a defence against arbitrary power could be turned into service as an 
apologia for property in the face of the propertyless. And the apologia was 
serviceable up to a point: for these 'propertyless', as we have seen, comprised 
multitudes of men and women who themselves enjoyed, in fact, petty property 
rights or agrarian use-rights whose definition was inconceivable without the 
forms of law. Hence the ideology of the great struck root in a soil, however 
shallow, of actuality. And the courts gave substance to the ideology by the 
scrupulous care with which, on occasion, they adjudged petty rights, and, on all 
occasions, preserved proprieties and forms. 
We reach, then, not a simple conclusion (law = class power) but a complex 
and contradictory one. On the one hand, it is true that the law did mediate 
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existent class relations to the advantage of the rulers; not only is this so, but as 
the century advanced the law became a superb instrument by which these rulers 
were able to impose new definitions of property to their even 2:reater advantao-e 
as in the extinction by law of indefinite agrarian use-rights and in the 
of enclosure. On the other hand, the law mediated these class relations throuO"h 
legal forms, imposed, again and again, inhibitions upon the actions of the 
rulers. For there IS a very large difference, which twentieth-century experience 
ought to have made clear even to the most exalted thinker, between arbitrary 
extra-legal power and the rule of law. And not only were the rulers (indeed, the 
ruhng class as a whole) inhibited by their own rules of law acrainst the exercise of 
unmediated force (arbitrary imprisonment, the of troops 
agamst the crowd, torture, and those other conveniences of power with which we 
are all conversant), but they also believed enough in these rules, and in their 
accompanying ideological rhetoric, to allow, in certain limited areas, the law 
itself to be a genuine forum within which certain kinds of class conflict were 
fought out. There were even occasions (one recaiJs John Wilkes and several of 
the trials of the 1790s) when the Government itself retired from the courts 
defeated. Such occasions served, paradoxically, to consolidate power, to enhance 
its legitimacy, and to inhibit revolutionary movements. But, to tum the paradox 
around, these same occasions served to bring power even further within 
constitutional controls. 
The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more than 
sham. In the same moment they may modify, in profound ways, the behaviour of 
the powerful, and mystify the powerless. They may disguise the true realities of 
power, but, at the same time, they may curb that power and check its intrusions. 
And it is often from within that very rhetoric that a radical critique of the 
practice of the society is developed: the reformers of the 1790s appeared, first of 
all, clothed in the rhetoric of Locke and of Blackstone. 
reflections lead me on to conclusions which may be different from 
some readers expect. I have shown in this study a political oligarchy 
mventmg callous and oppressive laws to serve its own interests. I have shown 
judges who, no less than bishops, were subject to political influence, whose 
sense of justice was humbug, and whose interpretation of the Jaws served only to 
enlarge their inherent class bias. Indeed, I think that this study has shown that for 
many of England's governing €lite the rules of law were a nuisance to be 
manipulated and bent in what ways they could; and that the allegiance such 
men as Walpole, Hardwicke or Paxton to the rhetoric of law was largely 
humbug. But I do not conclude from this that the rule of law itself was humbua. 
On the contrary, the inhibitions upon power imposed by law seem to me a Jega;y 
as as any handed from the struggles of the seventeenth 
to the eighteenth, and a true and Important cultural achievement of the ao-rarian 
and mercantile bourgeoisie, and of their supporting yeomen and artisans. e 
More than this, the notion of the regulation and reconciliation of conflicts 
throu?h the rule of law - and the elaboration of rules and procedures which, on 
occasmn, made some approximate approach towards the ideal - seems to me a 
cultural achievement of universal significance. I do not lay any claim as to the 
abstract, extra-historical impartiality of these rules. In a context of 2:ross class 
inequalities, the equity of the law must always be in some sham. 
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Transplanted as it was to even more inequitable contexts, this law could become 
an instrument of imperialism. For this law has found its way to a good many 
parts of the globe. But even here the rules and the rhetoric have imposed some 
inhibitions upon the imperial power. If the rhetoric was a mask, it was a mask 
which Gandhi and Nehru were to borrow. at the head of a million masked 
supporters. 
I am not starry-eyed about this at all. This has not been a star-struck book. I 
am insisting only upon the obvious point, which some modem Marxists have 
overlooked, that there is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of 
law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed 
beneath this law. But the rule of law itself the imposing of. effective inhibitions 
upon power and the defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, 
seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To deny or belittle this good is, 
in this dangerous century when the resources and pretensions of power continue 
to enlarge, a desperate error of intellectual abstraction. More than this, it is a 
self-fulfilling error, which encourages us to give up the struggle against bad laws 
and class-bound procedures, and to disarm ourselves before power. It is to throw 
away a whole inheritance of struggle about law, and within the forms of law, 
whose continuity can never be fractured without bringing men and women into 
immediate danger. 
In all of this I may be wrong. I am told that, just beyond the horizon, new 
forms of working-class power are about to arise which, being founded upon 
egalitarian productive relations, will require no inhibition and can dispense with 
the negative restrictions of bourgeois legalism. A historian is unqualified to 
pronounce on such utopian projections. All that he knows is that he can bring in 
support of them no historical evidence whatsoever. His advice might be: watch 
this new power for a century or two before you cut your hedges down. 
I therefore crawl out onto my own precarious ledge. It is true that in history 
the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize existent class relations. Its fonns 
and procedures may crystallize those relations and mask ulterior injustice. But 
this mediation, through the forms of law, is something quite distinct from the 
exercise of unmediated force. The forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct 
identity which may, on occasion, inhibit power and afford some protection to the 
powerless. Only to the degree that this is seen to be so can law be of service in 
its other aspect, as ideology. Moreover, the law in both its aspects, as formal 
rules and procedures and as ideology, cannot usefully be analysed in the 
metaphorical terms of a superstructure distinct from an infrastructure. While this 
comprises a large and self -evident part of the truth, the rules and categories of 
law penetrate every level of society, effect vertical as well as horizontal 
definitions of men's rights and status, and contribute to men's self -definition or 
sense of identity. As such law has not only been imposed upon men from above: 
it has also been a medium within which other social conflicts have been fought 
out. Productive relations themselves are, in part, only meaningful in terms of 
their definitions at law: the serf, the free labourer; the cottager with common 
rights, the inhabitant without; the unfree proletarian, the picket conscious of his 
rights; the landless labourer who may still sue his employer for assault. And if 
the actuality of the law's operation in class-divided societies has, again and 
again, fallen short of its own rhetoric of equity, yet the notion of the rule of law 
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is itself an unqualified good. 
This - the attainment towards a universal value -
found one ongm m Roman jurisprudence. The uncodified Eno-lish commOn law 
an alternative notation of law, in some ways ;ore flexible and 
- and therefore pJiant to the 'common sense' of the ruling 
class m other ways more available as a medium through which social conflict 
could fmd the of 'natural justice' of the jury 
c?uld make Itself felt. Smce thts tradttJon came to its maturity in 
England, its claims should command the historian's interest. 
And s?me part of the inheritance from this cultural moment may still be 
greatly changed contexts, within the United States or India or 
countries, it is important to re-examine the pretensions of the 
tmpenaltst donor. 
Th.is is t? argue the need for a general revaluation of eighteenth-century law, 
of which this study offers only a fragment. This study has been centred upon a 
bad law, drawn by bad legislators, and enlarged by the interpretations of bad 
No defence, m tenns of natural justice, can be offered for anything in 
the history of the Black Act. But even this study does not prove that all law as 
such IS bad .. Even this law bound the rulers to act only in the ways which its 
forrns permitted; they had difficulties with these forms; they could not always 
override the sense of natural justice of the jurors; and we may imao-ine how 
would have acted, against Jacobites or against disturbers of Richmond 
Park, If he had been subject to no forrns of law at all. 
.If we suppose is no more than a mystifying and pompous way in 
cl_ass IS registered and executed, then we need not waste our labour 
m studymg Its history and forrns. One Act would he much the same as another 
and all, from the standpoint of the ruled, would be Black. It is because 
11UJ1ters that we have bothered with this story at all. And this is also an answer to 
those umve-r:sai thmkers, impatient of all except the longue duree, who cannot be 
bothered with cartloads of victims at Tyburn when they set these beside the 
mdtces of mfant m?rtality. The victims of smallpox testify only to their own 
poverty and to the of medical science; the victims of the gallows are 
of a consciOus and elaborated code, justified in the name of a 
umversal human value. Since we hold this value to be a human good, and one 
whose usefulness the world has not yet outgrown, the operation of this code 
our attention. It is only when we follow through the 
of ti_S operation that we can show what it was worth, how it was bent, 
how proclaimed were falsified in practice. When we note Walpole 
John Judge Page handing down his death sentences, Lord 
Hardw_Icke wrenchmg the clauses of his Act from their context and Lord 
c.ompounding his manipulations, we feel contempt for men whose 
practice behed the resounding rhetoric of the age. But we feel contempt not 
because are of the notion of a just and equitable law but 
this has been betrayed by its own professors. The modern 
senstbthty whtch VIews this only within perspectives of our own archipelagos 
of gulags and of stalags, for whose architects the very notion of the rule of law 
would he a cnmmal heresy, will find my responses over-fussy. The plebs of 
eighteenth-century England were provided with a rule of law of some sort, and 
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they ought to have considered themselves lucky. What more could they expect? 
In fact, some of them had the impertinence, and the imperfect sense of 
historical perspective, to expect justice. On the gallows men would actually 
complain, in their 'last dying words', if they felt that in some particular the due 
forms of law had not been undergone. (We remember Vulcan Gates complaining 
that since he was illiterate he could not read his own notice of proclamation; and 
performing his allotted role at Tyburn only when he had seen the Sheriffs 
dangling chain.) For the trouble about law and justice, as ideal aspirations, is that 
they must pretend to absolute validity or they do not exist at alL If I judge the 
Black Act to be atrocious, this is not only from some standpoint in natural 
justice, and not only from the standpoint of those whom the Act oppressed, but 
also according to some ideal notion of the standards to which 'the law', as 
regulator of human conflicts of interest, ought to attain. For 'the law', as a logic 
of equity, must always seek to transcend the inequalities of class power which, 
instrumentally, it is harnessed to serve. And 'the law' as ideology, which pretends 
to reconcile the interests of all degrees of men, must always come into conflict 
with the ideological partisanship of class. 
We face, then, a paradox. The work of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
jurists, supported by the practical struggles of such men as Hampden and 
Lilburne, was passed down as a legacy to the eighteenth century, where it gave 
rise to a vision, in the minds of some men, of an ideal aspiration towards 
universal values of law. One thinks of Swift or of Goldsmith, or, with more 
qualifications, of Sir William Blackstone or Sir Michael Foster, If we today have 
ideal notions of what law might be, we derive them in some part from that 
cultural moment. It is, in part, in terms of that age's own aspiration that we judge 
the Black Act and find it deficient But at the same time this same century, 
governed as it was by the forms of law, provides a text-book illustration of the 
employment of law, as instrument and as ideology, in serving the interests of the 
ruling class. The oligarchs and the great gentry were content to be subject to the 
rule of law only because this law was serviceable and afforded to their hegemony 
the rhetoric of legitimacy, This paradox has been at the heart of this study, It 
was also at the heart of eighteenth-century society. But it was also a paradox 
which that society could not in the end transcend, for the paradox was held in 
equipoise upon an ulterior equilibrium of class forces. When the struggles of 
1790-1832 signalled that this equilibrium had changed, the rulers of England 
were faced with alarming alternatives. They could either dispense with the rule 
of law, dismantle their elaborate constitutional structures, countermand their 
own rhetoric and exercise power by force; or they could submit to their own rules 
and surrender their hegemony. In the campaign against Paine and the printers, in 
the Two Acts (1795), the Combination Acts (1799-1800), the repression of 
Peterloo (1819) and the Six Acts (1820) they took halting steps in the first 
direction. But in the end, rather than shatter their own self-image and repudiate 
150 years of constitutional legality, they surrendered to the law. In this surrender 
they threw retrospective light back on the history of their class, and retrieved for 
it something of its honour; despite Walpole, despite Paxton. despite Page and 
Hardwicke, that rhetoric had not been altogether sham. 
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